

## **REPRODUCING NIGERIAN STATE TOWARDS REAL PRODUCTIVE INVESTMENT: RECONFIGURING SOCIAL SAFETY NETS ‘PALLIATIVE’**

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### **Abstract**

Globally, social safety nets have become one of the viable strategies put in place to alleviate poverty and help financial needs of vulnerable especially developing countries like Nigeria. The study examines the need for reconfiguring ‘Palliative’ towards real productive investment in Nigerian economy. This is predicated on the implementation of the programme that has been over politicized and corruption have undermined the lofty intention of the policy. Sampling technique was used to determine the specific local Government Areas to be drawn from each senatorial districts in Ekiti State. A total of 175 beneficiaries were selected out of 4500 beneficiaries using Yamane’s formula for determining sample size. The study used structure questionnaire technique. The data gathered were analysed using both descriptive and inferential statistics and presented in frequency distribution tables and percentages. While interview were conducted among adhoc staff of SSNs seconded from all LGAs in the State. The major findings of the study include that SSNs has improved school enrolment and attendance in Nigerian Primary Schools. It was found out that the programme did not touch the real poor in Nigeria because of corruption and that politicians explored the avenue for political patronage. The study recommends upward review of the stipends paying to beneficiaries monthly to be commensurate with the inflation in the country and there must be proper and adequate monitoring of the implementation of SSNs.

**Keywords:** Nigerian State, Stateness, Social Safety Nets, Corruption.

### **INTRODUCTION**

Social Safety Nets (SSNs) are critical to reducing poverty because they support inclusive growth and promote resources to the most vulnerable in society. Although the World Bank traditionally viewed them as mechanisms for redistributing income and improving the welfare of those unable to participate in productive activities, SSNs are now also seen as critical for the growth agenda (Khandar, Koohral and Samd (2010). Cash transfers refer to all regular payments made to individuals and households to tackle poverty and vulnerability (Independent Commission for Aid Impact, 2016). Admittedly, cash transfer support individuals who are poor to acquire necessity of life. Therefore, enhancing their short-term choice; with urgent demands better met, the conditions assigned to cash transfer programmes serve as incentives for poor households to aid the education and health of their children.

Cash transfers can be conditional or unconditional when the provision of cash transfers is attached to compulsory behavioural obligations, they are conditional cash transfer programmes. These programme work by giving cash payments to households

only if they adhere to specific requirements, usually connected to health and education (de Janvry & Sadoulet, 2006). For instance, various conditional cash transfer programmes disbursed benefits conditional on the purpose of preventive healthcare services participation in health and nutrition education sessions planned to improve positive behavioural changes or school participation for school pupils or students (Barreintos & Dejoing, 2006, Lagarde, Haines & Palmer, 2007). Unconditional cash transfer are those in which households live in poverty, and there are no conditions attached to the transfer.

Be as it may, some countries have universal programmes protecting the poor and non-poor, yet these would not be included in the definitions of Social Safety Nets because they are not targetted' poverty alleviation strategies. Social Safety Nets are but one a variety of tools designed for poverty reduction, social risk management and social protection. They can contribute to achieving each of these goals, but they do not constitute all the tools available to achieve any of them.

Although no poverty objectives can motivate the design and implementation for SSNs, the Bank, with the overall mission of poverty reduction, generally does not directly support such objectives. This evaluation, through its country studies, acknowledge the relevance of addressing critical issues in a particular country context, however, it primarily evaluates the Bank support to SSNs based on objectives that focus on poverty vulnerability.

Recent crises have underscored the urgency of developing SSNs in all countries. The importance of social safety Nets was highlighted over the past decade as a series of international economic crises- in East Asia, the Rusia Federation, and South American – and the recent global crises sharply increase poverty. The fuel, food and financial crises since 2003 to date, which affected a majority of bank clients, workers, peasant farmers and middle-income groups, provided the most dramatic justification for effective SSNs. The World Bank estimates that the three crises pushed approximately 64 million additional people into extreme poverty (below \$1.25 1 day) in 2010, and additional 40 million people into people went hungry in 2009 because of the crises. These crises reversed previous solving in poverty reduction and intensified the hardship of those who were already trapped in poverty (Adejeo, 2006).

Notwithstanding, this controversial debate, the focus of this investigation is on the social safety Nets, considering the micro economic effect with fraudulent act associated with the scheme of which Nigeria is currently marred in a State of obfuscation. Therefore, crux of this study is to examine how this shady progammes can be reconfigured to the extent, it will become real investments that can generate employment for young adults and reduce social vices in Nigerian societies.

Obviously, social safety net programmes have become popular in developing countries over the past two decades. First introduced in Latin America, they were subsequently expanded to Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Starting with Bolsa familla in Brazil and prospera in Mexico in 1997, the number of conditional cash transfer programmes in the developing world rose to 27 in 2008 and 64 in 2014. While there are

important differences in implementation across countries and regions, they share one important feature. They encourage beneficiaries to adopt positive behaviours. Globally, they typically include promoting school attendance, improving nutrition practices, and undertaking regular immunization and health care visits. Some programmes in Africa also focus on the additional divisions of civil registration, early childhood development, hygiene, sanitation and water use (Adeniran, 2018).

In Africa, the nature and intensity of the mechanisms deployed to encourage investment in human capital vary greatly, often depending on the supply of basic and monitoring capacity in a country. Social safety Nets programmes may be classified in different categories, along two dimensions. First, depending on the type of action which is required (participate in promotion session, comply with a simple, punctual behaviour, adopt a more complex and continuous behaviour etc) and second depending on the extent to which compliance is compulsory, verified and used to impose penalties. In addition to impose strict conditions but communicate strongly around specific behaviours, and as a result beneficiaries perceive a conditionally for example, evaluation of the Lesotho Child Grants Programme and Malawi Social Cash Transfer highlight the strong messaging and social marketing of the programmes on the need to use transfers for the welfare of children which de facto are perceived by many beneficiaries as actual conditions. In Nigeria context, programmes tend to encourage participation in promotion session, and compliance with requirement is often not monitored nor penalized. While in Eastern and Southern Africa, programmes tend to be closer to the Latin American model, wherein conditions are monitored and penalties are enforced for non-compliance.

Essentially, political process shape, the extent and nature of social policy. Decisions about the scale of social safety nets and other forms of redistribution towards vulnerable are functions of debates and struggles between competing interest groups sets of incentives.

The staggering of safety nets across Africa in the past decades proves that ideas, preferences and political change platforms overtime, even in places where political environment was initially unsuitable. Political dynamics evolve, windows of opportunity open and close. Imparting and learning from these processes for building sustainable safety net systems. The technical assessment for crafting and implementation ambitious programmes (Baker, 2010).

To this end, scaling up social safety nets should encompass recognizing and leveraging the politics of safety nets. Beyond the theoretical or historical discussions on the multiple ways in which political, social and cultural factors determine social policy (for which there is a large literature), specific examples from across Africa of ways in which political processes shifted to shape, expand and sustain safety nets programmes can provide elements of clarity and guidance to practitioners and advocates of social policy.

Notably, there are three main interaction between politics and social safety nets. First, the scope of safety nets depend on their acceptability, which depends on social norms or ideological factors such as perceived causes of poverty and preferences for

distribution. It is important to examine the conditions in which political preference may shift to open space for greater commitment to redistributive policies. Second, the choice of program and design parameters are often influenced by political preferences and incentives, and may in turn influence the level of commitment to safety net programmes. The design process should factor in the programmes. Third, there is feedback loop: the implementation of safety net programmes shape the political environment. Politicians and citizens adjust their preferences and incentives and redefine their relationship when social transfer are implemented.

No doubt, safety nets have become an exploitation part of micro economic policy reforms. In the current context of fiscal tightening, many countries are looking for ways to rationalize and target assistance schemes more effectively. Terminating universal subsidies, a policy targeted and expensive programme, may save public resources, but also negatively affects segments of the population. In Nigeria, a first wave of removal of oil subsidy 2023 resulted in a price hike potentially harmful to the poor. This prompted the Government to scale up social safety nets in order to further wave of subsidy removal. In some countries in Asia, programmes have also been expanded as part of an effort to stimulate economic growth. Examples include the expansion of social pension systems in China and Thailand during the global recession (ADB 2009 Kidd and Dameran 2016, Swanrada and Wesumperume, 2012).

### **The Nature of Nigerian State**

The first segment of this dimension focused on the State generally while the second segment analyses the specific characteristics of ruling. It is simultaneously an agent of the dominant class yet not controlled by the class. In Miliband (1972) posited while the State does act on behalf of the ruling class, it does not for the most part act at its behest. Secondly, the state is simultaneously both an expression of class exploitation and domination, and something more than a simple expression (Marenin, 1837).

These two aspects contribute on intrinsic unity..... but the forces of execution may also enter into contradiction with relations of domination in the state apparatus (Therborn, 1978); that is domination may be distorted by its manner of organizing, thirdly, states are a fabric of ordered tension between a variety of competition forms of authority, each with different myths of legitimacy and principles of allegiance (Lonsdle, 1981). Lastly, the state is both within and above society and, as such, serves both the specific interests of the dominant class and the general interests of society.

A valid general conception of the state needs to explain the agent the public good, and the interests of state role of the state needs to show how the state arises from and remains linked to its social formation in such a way that it can present itself as above society, can act as the manager of all interests, and have the power, authority and discretion to do its job. The state may speak with one voice ideologically and internationally yet agencies act as if they were autonomous. (The oil scandal in Nigeria is a good example-the state got stuck with bill yet, as a state, it had no interest in importing that much fuel nor did it control the process). Ruling capacity of a State is the ability to

extract necessary resources (e.g tax, labour or legitimacy) and to implement decisions and policies (that is effectively hold its agents and social groups to execution of stated tasks). Each of these attributes has to be organized and reproduced continually to exist and be usable. All these three attributes can fluctuate from high to low levels, and so can be stateness. By stateness means three essential attributes of the state namely autonomy, unity and ruling capacity. Autonomy is the ability of the state to act independently of social forces, to make choices and carry them through against the wishes of any social group or social forces in general. These attributes had long ago missing in Nigeria States because groups contest to reproduce the idea of the State in an organizational form which serves their interests and values. As social groups and the conflict coalitions they form succeed and fail so fluctuate the organizational structure of the State (Akanbi, 2020).

Evidence abound that Nigeria is a captured State, stocked with impositions of social groups and forces (the carbal) intending to make State execute and satisfy their premodial interests at the expense of general public interest. The religion and ethnic egocentric concern have been politicized to the extent that insecurity and unstable economic system have overwhelmed the statutory function of the State, to protect life and properties of the citizens and even to provide avenue for conducive environment for economic thrive. The executives, politicians and elected representatives in Nigeria are now struggling between national interest and sectional interest Kelher (1983) argues that the State often act instrumentally for its survival and that, rather than being inordinately influenced by certain 'interests' and 'classes', the State follows its own logic and is guided by its own purposes. (Consequently), the State may often find itself having to engage in conflict with (interests and classes) over matters of policy. The argument here is true enough yet there is no State which acts and no logic or purpose it pursues, but only actors and groups who for their own purposes espouse State organisations as a means to further some interests. The instrumental interests of State exist in the particular coalitions of social and State actors who reproduce the State.

However, the reproduction of the State is a normal process. Understanding the autonomy of the State ought to assume the same forces and constraints or do explanations of political conflict and cooperation. Meanwhile, the interest promoted by Nigerian State's rule are often distorted by the process of organizing and implementing rule. States are not disinterested tools but are composed of actors and organisations which have their own interests, identifies and priorities. Anyway, in Nigeria, State always portrays its actions as public good policies especially the prevailing palliative under the pretence of social safety nets, yet is always under pressure to conceive what is the public good in particularistic ways. Yet agencies and agents of the State who, by their employment in the State, develop a conception of interest which is distinct from or above social definitions of interests counterpoise their notion of the public good against such particularistic demands. Hence, the dominant conception of the 'public good' embodies more than the ideas of the ruling group or class.

The emphasis of this division reveals reasons for manifestation of multiferous social safety nets in Nigeria without political will of Government to impact positive change in the life of citizens despite their pronouncement of economic development as the main reason for formulation of those social safety nets.

Conceptualizing development: Development as a concept has undergone metamorphosis since the Second World War ended in 1945. The meaning and the conceptualization of development was greatly influenced by the ideological contradiction between the socialist East and capitalist West. The issue of ideology of development is an outcome of economics growth while scholars like Prostour (1952), Henrod Domar (1951) posited that economic development result from structural changes, savings and investments in an economy. The failure of economic growth in most developing and developed Latin America and Africa in the late 1970s, to deliver corresponding social goods and solve problems of unemployment, poverty, disease, hunger and everincreasing crimes and war necessitated the new thinking and redifinition of development from economic growth centred perspective to human centred approach (Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013). In this light chandler (2007) defined development as a broader concept that recognizes psychological and natural factors that measure human well-being. Development is therefore a multifaceted phenomenon and man centred. It is a process of empowering people to maximaze their potentials and develop the knowledge capacity to exploit nature to meet daily human needs (Rodney, 1972). Nndi, 1981 and Ake, 2001). The transformation of the society and the emergence of social and economic organisations are critical indications of development (stigliz cited in Nwanegbo & Odigbo, 2013).

Ironically, the underlying factors for social safety nets formulation in Nigeria is to alleviate poverty, enhance economic development that will translate to poverty reduction, increase employment opportunities and equally facilitate human potentials in skill acquisition and knowledge advancement that will eventually result to economic growth, peaceful co-existence, crime reduction and sustainable security atmosphere in the society. But the paradoxes of policy implementation render these lofty intentions to mere avenues of constituted organized crime against humanity through corrupt practices at both federal and state levels of which the elected executives at all levels seized and explored the social safety net programmes under the disguise of palliative to gather more supporters for their parties (political patronage) and seek for second term in office without having recourse to the primary motive for the policy formulation. Pressman and Wildabsk (1973) expressed their fear thus: people now appear to think that implementation should be easy; they are therefore upset when events do not occur or turn out badly. We would consider our effort a success if more people began with the understanding that implementation, under the best circumstance is exceedingly difficult. They would, therefore, be pleasantly surprised when a fear good things really happen.

Lack of political will towards public policy (SSNs) implementation it is obvious that social safety net programmes at implementation or delivery is negatively or positively affected by the attitude or bahviour of the implementators. That is, if they are negatively

disposed to a policy, there will be lack of commitment to the implementation process. It has been stated above that the Nigerian State is privatized, dependent, weak and lacks autonomy. Therefore, despite the availability of public policies that stand to better the lot of the average Nigerian, the State informatively lack the political will to positively realize such policy objectives. The argument is that, even though the set objectives of government policies stand to benefit the public, the cabal that hold the top echelon of government hostage, at any point in time, will jeopardize or frustrate the implementation of public policies (Aluko, Ogunseye, etal; 2021).

Corruption is another major issue in the politics of public policy implementation in Nigeria, especially the so called 'Palliative' when corruption penetrates the implementation process, public policy becomes mutated and the desired goal may not be achieved. Most public policies are formulated and funds appropriated for, but corruption like an octopus has continued to strangle, ruin and make impossible the implementation process. Due to corruption, Nigerian is still under the yolk of excruciating poverty despite the several social safety net programmes formulated to eradicate poverty from Nigeria society. The problems of lack of accountability and transparency in the implementation of these lofty programmes make Nigerian to conclude that it is just an organized robbery of both the Federal and State Government.

Although, corruption is no doubt a global phenomenon that has threatened and still continues to threaten the developmental efforts in many nations of the world. In Nigeria, eradicating corruption has been a major concern of successive government in the country because of its negative impact on government effective service delivery in terms of implementation of public policy such as social safety net programmes. Adamu (2007) posits that corruption exists in one form or the other in all societies. The major difference in the case of Nigeria is the extent of its pervasiveness and its implication for good governance and implementation on public policies, its value system and political culture in particular. To him (Adamu, 2007), an average Nigerians has accepted corruptions as an inevitable and uncontrollable, believing that the society as a whole is corrupt and beyond remedy. Additionally, Nigerians believed that nothing meaningful will ever get done to correct or punish those perpetuating these crimes.

### **Theoretical framework**

The adoption of theoretical framework in the social sciences greatly help in the analysis and understanding of concepts from some theoretical point of view and / or orientation. Therefore, the theoretical framework of analysis adopted in this paper is the principal-Agent theory.

The principal – Agent theory adopted from Batley (2004) examined organizational relationship as a tension between the “Principal” who demands a service and the “Agent” who provides it. The model assumes that actors are motivated by rational self-interest. The issue in connection with this study is how the Principal (in this case, the Nigerian citizens) can manage the self-interest of those empowered to act on their behalf (i.e the Agents:

Government officials, politicians, legislators, executives, bureaucrat etc) so that it is aligned with the purposes that they (the principal) wish to achieve.

The problem arises not just from content of interest but also from the privilege access of the agents to information the problem of asymmetric information. The agents who have been employed to provide a service will tend to use their superior knowledge to divert benefits in their own direction.

Agagu (1996) asserts that public Administration itself is susceptible to corruption, since officials exercise a substantial amount of power. There are possibilities for acquiring improper benefits by interpreting or bending rules in favour of certain groups or individuals. All government seek to have in place a number of safeguard for deterring and dealing with corruption within administrative agencies.

In the same time, public Administration has to develop ways and means to prevent and detect corruption in other section of society. Much of the benefit of rapid economic growth via social safety policy or a stable political order may be lost in the growing tide of corruption. However, in a democratic polity, the intimate Principals are the citizens who are the consumer/recipient of specific services provided by the government. In the Principal-Agent theory, they are principal in the sense that politicians as Agents seek their mandate from and act as the representative of the public. In their turn appointed leaders in executing the programmes and policies of the government. Each of these players has a measure of autonomy and their own interests to advance.

Be as it may, the likelihood of the Principal effectively controlling the Agent depends on how much information the principal has about the performance of the Agent, and how far the Principal can structure the relationship so as to control the Agent or give incentives so as to make the Agents interest correspond to the Principals.

## **Methodology**

By using structured questionnaire, interviews and demand analysis, the study will capture detailed information on how social safety net programmes was undermined through corruption and overpolitization of public polices in Nigeria. The quantitative data also enables the study to analyse relationship and trends within the data collected without manipulating any variables. It provides a systematic approach to studying in various corrupt practices showcased in view of initiating strategies for alleviating poverty in Nigeria society. The use of quantitative data allow the study to objectively present and interpret findings, thereby a foundation for meaningful conclusions and recommendations. In addition, both secondary and primary data were utilized. Secondary data were obtained from sources that existed largely in documented form such as journals, textbooks, newspapers, annual reports, statistical bulleting as well as primary data. The study also collected primary data through questionnaire and personal observations.

It is obvious that Nigeria is analyze to the forces of production. Although state apparatuses derive from existing class relations, more established may assume a material existence, efficiency and martial which are to a certain extent independent of current state

policies and class relations leading to significant disjunctions between state and its apparatuses. This tenacious materiality of organization makes them the crucial mediators between the desires of the ruling class and implementation and impact of state policies on society. The ruling class exploits ethnic diversity and existing political culture to entrench a ‘fix it while you can’ style of politics. Nigerian political culture is a paradoxical blend of cynicism and optimism. Cynicism about the capacity of people to influence the political process, about the inclinations and probity of public officials and the very viability of politics as a method of allocations, and decision-making yet also embodies tremendous optimism about the future which diffuses discontent, leads to escapes into other worldliness, and disdains political impulse. The questionnaires, is reproduced, decamps, changes forms and its nature in the same way and by same forces which reproduce socially grouped constellations of interests and values.

### Discussion and Results

Nine LGAs were selected in total. The sample for the study were chosen from the nine local government randomly selected across the three senatorial districts out of Sixteen LGAs in Ekiti State. In order to ensure the sample is a true representation of the study population. The respondents were selected with 1:10 ratios if the population of selected local government (Moba, Oye, Gboyin, Ise/Orun, Ijero and Ekiti West local government in Ekiti North, Ekiti South and Ekiti Central senatorial Districts respectively).

S/N	Senatorial Districts	Local Governments	Estimated population	Sampled population
1	Ekiti Central	Efon- Alaaye	207,100	56
		Ekiti West	268,000	73
		Ijero	239,600	65
2	Ekiti North	Ilejemeje	255,200	69
		Moba	65,100	8
		Oye	206,300	56
	Ekiti South	Gboyin	141,200	38
		Ikere	332,200	90
		Ise.Orun	217,700	59
				524

Source: fieldwork, 2025

The total sample size of each local governments selected based on ratio 1: 10

Projected population of each local governments x 100 x 10

Projected population of Ekiti State (3,679,400)

$$\text{Ekiti Central: Ijero} \quad \frac{239,600}{3,679,400} \times \frac{100}{1} = 6.5 \quad (6.5 \times 10) = 65$$

$$\text{Ekiti west} \quad \frac{268,900}{3,679,400} \times \frac{100}{1} = 7.3 \quad (7.3 \times 10) = 73$$

$$\text{Efon-Alaaye} \quad \frac{207100}{3,679,400} \times \frac{100}{1} = 5.6 \quad (5.6 \times 10) = 56$$

$$\text{Ekiti North: Oye LGAs} \quad \frac{206,300}{3,679,400} \times \frac{100}{1} = 5.6 \quad (5.6 \times 10) = 56$$

$$\text{Moba} \quad \frac{65,100}{3,679,400} \times 100 = 1.76 \quad (1.76 \times 10) = 17.6 - 18$$

$$\text{Ilejemeje} \quad \frac{255,200}{2,679,400} \times 100 = 6.94 \quad (6.94 \times 10) = 69.4 - 69$$

$$\text{Ekiti South: Gboyin} \quad \frac{141,200}{3,679,400} \times 100 = 38.37 \quad (38.37 \times 10) = 38$$

$$\text{Ise/Orun} \quad \frac{217,700}{3,679,400} \times 100 = 5.92 \quad (5.92 \times 10) = 5.92 - 59$$

$$\text{Ikere} \quad \frac{332,200}{3,679,400} \times 100 = 9.03 \quad (9.03 \times 10) = 90.3 - 90$$

### **Effects of SSNs on Poverty Reduction in Nigeria**

It was revealed that 43% of respondents strongly agreed that the effects of social safety net programmes towards poverty reduction in Nigeria is massive, while only 10% respondents agreed that the impact of SSNs in terms of poverty alleviation is felt. The remaining 47% respondent strongly disagreed that SSNs did not reduce poverty in Nigerian society with comment that those respondents that agreed has affiliation with political starwants in their community.

### **Impact of poverty alleviation Programmes on socio-economic development of vulnerable**

It was shown from responses that 54% respondents claimed that there was no positive impact of poverty alleviation programmes on socioeconomic development of the vulnerable. Adding that the monthly stipends was not regular and inflation has overwhelmed the purchasing value of the stipends while only 45% respondents appraised the existence of SSNs in view of improvement of socio-economic status of the vulnerable. Poverty Alleviation programme (SSNs) increase citizens' trust in democratic leaders in Nigeria.

Here it was revealed that 70% respondent strongly opposed the formulation of SSNs as medium of bridging the gap between citizens and their leaders, while only 20% respondent strongly agreed that SSNs programme is feedback mechanisms for the poor and vulnerable and 10% respondent only agreed to that assertion.

### **SSN programmes should continue or reinvested to real productive public business**

Almost all the respondents support reinvestment of poverty alleviation programmes to more and real investments that will generate employment opportunities in the society with 82% respondents identified themselves with idea of total stoppage of any form of palliatives schemes, only 18% respondents claimed that they wanted the continuity of the palliative programmes that it is 'free money'.

## **Corruption hinders the success of SSN programmes in Nigeria**

More than two-third respondents (76%) claimed that the major problem of public policies implementation in Nigeria is corruption that has become a norm in Nigerian society, while 24% respondents disagreed that corrupt practices occur in the implementation of social safety net programmes may be due to their party affiliation.

### **Response of Interviewees**

The study conducted interview with 45 adhoc staff of social safety net programmes and questions were asked on the following items, impact of the programmes on poverty reduction, effects of corruption on the implementation of the programmes and whether the programmes should continue or reconfigure towards real investments that can influence job opportunities in the country.

Interviews conducted among the facilitators that are responsible for payment of beneficiaries revealed that corruption in the social safety net programmes stem from the Federal level to state coordinating office down to Local Governments officer appointed to oversee the activities of facilitators in their respective LGAs. They began by saying that the NASCO did not reveal the actual amount to be paid to beneficiaries monthly, while SOCU will at times delay the release of the disbursed money from NASCO without any reason other than waiting for State executive to give order. Further that lack of transparency from the Federal Level (NASCO) paved way for State coordinating office (SOCU) to do whatever they like with the stipend. In furtherance to this instance, the Local coordinating officials engage in making unauthorized deductions from the stipends given to beneficiaries, even to the extent that any beneficiaries absent on pay day may not receive such money again lying that they will return unpaid money to the State office.

The respondents equally revealed that seminars organized for facilitators for three days will be reduced to two days while they would be made to sign at departure for three days. Besides, they were made to sleep together, that is, two persons in one bedroom apartment) but on record, it will appear one person per room. The most horrible aspect, was that the wife of State coordinating officer usually responsible for feeding. These ugly experience made most of the facilitators withdrawn from the exercise concluded that they were just working for State coordinator.

Respondents remarked that the whole scheme has lost focus because of politics. Politicians will come to the registration centres with their lists consist of those that are not qualified to participate in the programmes, this includes their wife, children, relatives, party members of which some of them are government employees. Besides, if information of social safety nets will come out for legible Nigerians to register, the message will go to party secretariats without publicity for general public.

Aside, the Grievance Redress Officers interviewed complained of quarterly mobilization usually ₦70,000 was cut down to ₦19,000 without prior information or notice. Finally concluded that it is better the programmes are stopped because it is not transforming the life of the people that the programmes were formulated given different names just to enrich the State Governors and prepare the minds of voters for second term

in office bid. That the scheme lack transparency, accountability, monitoring, evaluation, auditing and no feedback mechanism.

Political accountability is linked to human development because it is a necessary condition for democracy. It is a key requirement of good governance not only governmental institution but also the private sector and civil society organisations must be accountable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders. Both social and economic development suffers if political accountability is weak. By making corruption more difficult, political accountability contributes to economic development. It accountability empowers the poor, pro-poor policies may be introduced with their attendant social and economic benefits (Ihonubere 2004).

Above all, there must be transparency display in the implementation of public policies such as SSNs to bring positive results in accordance to the motive of formulation. Transparency connotes that decision taken and their enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations, it also means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such decision unlike SSNs “palliative” that only circulate among the politicians where all expected vacancies would have been filled up before the information get to the general public that are more vulnerable than the parties followers and loyalists. It also include that enough information is printed and that it is provided in easily understandable forms and media. Transparency refers to the availability of information to the general public. Thus, it both complements and reinforces predictability. Transparency in government decision making and public implementation reduces uncertainty and can help inhibit corruption among public officials to this end, rules and procedures that are simple, straight forward and easy to apply are preferable to those that provide discretionary powers to government officials or that are susceptible to different interpretations. No doubt good governance requires fair legal framework that are enforced impartially it also requires all protection of human rights particularly the minorities (Henry 2003).

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

The findings of this study underscore the inextricable link between corruption, class struggle with governance and poor implementation of public policies such as social safety net programmes in Ekiti and by extension, Nigeria. Further, that if the analysis outlined is current, the Nigerian State be a better State, that is more likely to act in the pursuit of all three of its interests – its own, specific and general interests – if its stateness were improved corruption and ethnicity would have to be actively opposed. This in turn, would happen if the power of ethnic consciousness were taken seriously and there is openness, transparency and accountability at the government circle to suppress all forms corrupt practices of both elected executives and their agencies.

It was found out in the study that social safety net programmes only have impact on school enrolment and attendance but failed totally in the area of poverty alleviation.

It was revealed in the study that the implementation of the scheme faces a lot of paradoxes that underscored the lofty intention of the policies.

Lastly, it was found out that the various SSNs are prone to massive waste of public resources and that it should be redirected towards real investments that enhance job creation in the country.

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